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Benjamin M. Friedman
William Joseph Maier Professor of Political Economy
Harvard University

The central proposition at the core of modern western economics – what economists sometimes call the “first welfare theorem” of economics – is that behavior
motivated by no more than individuals’ or firms’ self-interest can, and under
the right conditions will, lead to beneficial outcomes not merely for themselves
but for others as well. Where did this proposition, and its centrality to modern
economics, come from?
Most students of economics would point to Adam Smith, and in particular to
his best-known book, the Wealth of Nations; and that answer would be right. But
the further question it raises is where the thinking in the Wealth of Nations came
from. What led Adam Smith to the insight that made him (as he certainly was)
the father of the intellectual discipline we know today as economics? And what
made his ideas the basis for western thinking about economics ever since?
The answer that I would like to put forward is a surprising one, and I believe it
is especially interesting in two ways: first, for the unusual perspective it provides
on where economics as an intellectual discipline comes from; and second, for the
light it sheds on some otherwise puzzling aspects of our public discussion of economics, and our debate surrounding economic policies, today. The centerpiece of
this story is the crucial transition in thinking about such matters that took place
1

I am grateful to Daniel Finn for helpful comments on an earlier draft.

1

in the eighteenth century, mostly in England and Scotland, and that we today
identify primarily with Adam Smith.
The commonly accepted view of economic life, in the English-speaking world
as of the beginning of the eighteenth century, implicitly embraced several propositions quite unlike familiar thinking in the field today. To begin, there was no
agreement that individuals had the capacity to perceive correctly what actions and
pursuits were in their own self-interest. There was also no sense that their pursuing
that self-interest, even if they perceived it correctly, would have any more broadly
beneficial consequences; those acting on their own self-interest would presumably
benefit no one but themselves. As a result, acting on one’s own self-interest was
viewed, as it had been for centuries, as a selfish act. In the standard vocabulary
of, say, 1700, acting out of self-interest was a “vice,” and the standard adjective
applied to such behavior was “vicious.”
The transition began with Bernard Mandeville’s poem, The Fable of the Bees,
first published to little notice in London in 1714, but then published in expanded
book-length form, to a great deal of notice, in 1723. Mandeville clearly set out
the basic insight that the pursuit of individual self-interest often leads to outcomes that are beneficial to other people as well. Why, then, do we not think of
Mandeville, rather than Smith, as the creator of modern economics? The reason
is that Mandeville displayed no sense of the mechanism behind his idea, nor any
understanding of the conditions that made it so. In an intellectual world by then
pervasively shaped by Newton, in which scientists and others looked for systematic
explanations and mechanisms, Mandeville provided none. His only recourse was
to refer, vaguely, to the role of “wise statesmen” who somehow made all this come
about. For Mandeville, like those who preceded him, acting on one’s self-interest
was still “vicious” behavior. Indeed, he highlighted the point in the sub-title he
chose for his book: Private Vices, Publick Benefits. What were those “private vices”?
Merely actions taken in pursuit of a person’s own self-interest.
The next half century saw an intense and widespread reaction to what Mandeville
had written. In large part this reaction was a rejection, mostly on moral grounds, of
the claim that acting in a “vicious” way privately could lead to “benefits” publicly.
But much of the ensuing discussion displayed a fascination with Mandeville’s
insight. The interested intellectuals of the era understood that he was on to something, and that it was important. Two of the key participants in this debate were
especially significant for how the story unfolded. One was Francis Hutcheson,
professor of moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow, and Adam Smith’s
principal teacher. The second was David Hume, who was never able to attain a
university appointment because of his notoriety as a publicly avowed atheist, but
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who nonetheless was Adam Smith’s closest friend and principle mentor.
Smith’s Wealth of Nations appeared in 1776, at the end of this half-century of
commentary and debate spurred by Mandeville’s Fable. Smith’s argument went
something like this: First, individuals do correctly perceive their self-interest, at
least when they act as producers of goods and services. (Interestingly, Smith was
dubious that people perceive their self-interest correctly when they act as consumers, but that further step was not necessary for the key proposition he sought to
establish.) Second, the desire to pursue our self-interest is a fundamental aspect of
human nature, no more to be criticized than the fact that we eat or breathe. Third,
pursuing our self-interest, under the right conditions, does lead to outcomes that
are beneficial more broadly than merely for ourselves. Fourth – and here is the
reason economists look to Smith, rather than Mandeville, as the father of modern
economics – the key condition that allows these more broadly beneficial outcomes
to follow from actions motivated by mere self-interest is market competition.
Unlike Mandeville, therefore, Smith met the standard of the Newtonian era in
which he lived; he offered a systematic mechanism that, under the stated conditions, made privately self-interested behavior globally beneficial. Not surprisingly,
with the Wealth of Nations the vocabulary of “vice” and “vicious” is finally gone.
Smith became an international celebrity in his own lifetime, and the Wealth of
Nations quickly became an international bestseller. By the time of Smith’s death,
just fourteen years later, the book had gone through five editions in English not
to mention numerous translations. By the early nineteenth century, Smith’s ideas
were broadly accepted, especially in Britain and even more so in the United States.
They have dominated the discipline of economics ever since.
But why? What led Mandeville, and then Hutcheson and Hume, and finally
Smith, to this very different view of the way in which human beings behave individually and interact socially? And what accounted for the astonishingly rapid
acceptance of Smith’s views?
A central part of the answer, I believe, was a powerful and quite fundamental
transition in religious thinking that was then in progress in the English-speaking
Protestant world. But why would religious thinking matter for this purpose? Were
Smith and the other key figures in this set of intellectual developments religiously
dedicated men, committed to bringing their religious principles to bear on their
thinking about what we now call economics? They certainly were not. Hume, to
repeat, was an avowed atheist. There is no evidence of religious commitment on
Smith’s part, or Mandeville’s either. Hutcheson was committed to religious beliefs,
but not in a way that plausibly motivated his other lines of thought. The story
must be something else.
3

Why, then, would what was happening in religious thinking matter for the
development of economics? Part of the answer is that religion was more pervasive
and more central to the life of that time than anything we know in today’s western
world. Religion was co-terminus with politics; just a generation before Smith was
born, England had had its “Glorious Revolution,” which brought William and
Mary to power. Religion motivated wars; a century before Smith’s lifetime, the
Thirty Years’ War had wracked the continent, and the English Civil War had followed from the Puritan Revolution. When Smith was in his twenties, the Highland
Rebellion of 1745 had swept across his native Scotland. Religion also determined
government patronage, and especially so in Scotland. With the Act of Union, in
1707, the Scots had abolished both their parliament and their royal court, but
they had preserved the independent Church of Scotland.
And religion was then a part of mainstream intellectual life in a way that it is not
today. Edinburgh in the mid-eighteenth century was the center of the remarkable
intellectual movement we now call the Scottish Enlightenment. One well-known
feature of the Scottish Enlightenment was that the “literati” of the day (that was
how they thought of themselves) frequently gathered in various dining and debate
clubs. The most prominent of these during the 1750s and early 1760s was the Select
Society. Of the Select Society’s original thirty-one members, five were Church of
Scotland clergymen – compared to only four professors, Smith included). When
Smith and Hume dined out, therefore – “dinner” being the meal that took place
at two in the afternoon – the colleagues with whom they were talking and debating routinely included clerics.
A second reason religious thinking influenced thinking about what later became
known as “economics” is that religion in the English-speaking Protestant world
was at this time undergoing a fundamental and highly contended transition: the
movement away from orthodox Calvinism, which had reached its peak influence
in the English-speaking world in the middle of the seventeenth century. Three
elements of this transition bore particularly powerful implications for thinking
about economic matters.
The first was a turn away from the Calvinist belief that all humans are “utterly
depraved” as a consequence of the Fall – the fateful choice made by Eve, and
then Adam, acting at the urging of the serpent, which led to their being not only
banished from the Garden of Eden but also cursed by God. In the Institutes of the
Christian Religion, his monumental work published in 1559, Calvin wrote of “the
miserable ruin, into which the rebellion of the first man cast us …our own ignorance, vanity, poverty, infirmity, and – what is more – depravity and corruption.”
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“Let us define original sin,” Calvin wrote: “a hereditary depravity and corruption
of our nature, diffused into all parts of the soul.”
Moreover, “this is not liability for another’s transgression … we through his
[Adam’s] transgression have become entangled in the curse … not only has punishment fallen upon us from Adam, but a contagion imparted by him resides in
us.” Further, “even infants themselves … are guilty not of another’s fault but of
their own. For, even though the fruits of their iniquity have not yet come forth,
they have the seed enclosed within them. Indeed, their whole nature is a seed of
sin.” “This perversity never ceases in us.” “Our nature is not only destitute and
empty of good but so fertile of every evil that it cannot be idle.” “So depraved is
his nature that he can be moved only to evil.”
The same thinking echoed through the official creeds of Protestantism in England,
including the Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion of the Church of England, promulgated
in 1571, and the Westminster Confession of Faith, issued by the newly ascendant
Puritans in 1647. Chapter VI of the Westminster Confession, titled “Of the Fall of
Man, of Sin, and of the Punishment Thereof,” states that “Our first parents …
sinned, in eating the forbidden fruit… and so became dead in sin.” “They being
the root of all mankind, the guilt of this sin was imputed; and the same death
in sin, and corrupted nature, conveyed to all their posterity.” “From this original
corruption, whereby we are utterly indisposed, disabled and made opposite to
all good, and wholly inclined to do all evil, do proceed all actual transgressions.”
One key shift in religious thinking during the late seventeenth and then the
eighteenth century that was important for the birth of modern economic thinking,
therefore, was the movement away from this belief that all human beings are utterly
depraved, toward the belief that human beings instead possess an inherent goodness.
A second was the movement away from the belief in predestination: the belief
that only a few people are saved and that nothing people do, either individually
or collectively, can influence who is saved and who is not. As Calvin put it in the
Institutes, “it comes to pass by God’s bidding that salvation is freely offered to some
while others are barred from access to it.” “He does not indiscriminately adopt all
into the hope of salvation but gives to some what he denies to others.” Further,
this selection by God is without regard to the choices and actions that individuals
take: “God, utterly disregarding works, chooses those whom he has decreed within
himself.” “God of his mere good pleasure preserves whom he will.”
Indeed, not only does God make this selection without regard to individuals’
works, according to Calvin, but the selection pre-dates human existence. “God
… established by his eternal and unchangeable plan those whom he long before
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determined … to receive into salvation, and those whom, on the other hand, he
would devote to destruction.” “With respect to the elect, this plan was founded
upon his freely given mercy, without regard to human worth.” “But by his just
and irreprehensible but incomprehensible judgment he has barred the door of life
to those whom he has given over to damnation.”
Here too, both the Thirty-Nine Articles and the Westminster Confession closely
followed the principles Calvin had laid down. According to Chapter III of the Westminster Confession, titled “Of God’s Eternal Decree,” “By the decree of God, for the
manifestation of his glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting
life; and others are foreordained to everlasting death.” “Those of mankind that are
predestinated unto life, God, before the foundation of the world was laid … hath
chosen … out of his mere free grace and love, without any foresight of faith, or
good works.” “The rest of mankind God was pleased … to pass by; and to ordain
them to dishonor and wrath for their sin, to the praise of his glorious justice.”
The alternative belief, toward which the prevalent view among English-speaking
Protestants was moving in the late seventeenth and then the eighteenth century,
was that anyone can potentially be saved, and, most importantly for the implications for economic thinking, that individual choice and action – what we would
call human agency – plays a role in this determination.
Finally, yet a third element of the movement away from orthodox Calvinism
during this period was a shift in thinking away from the belief that the reason
all humans exist in the first place is to glorify God, toward the belief that human
happiness is also a divinely intended end.
Because this transition away from orthodox Calvinist belief is of such importance
for understanding how the Smithian revolution came about, it is worth looking
at what some of the proponents of the new thinking in this era (they would never
have called themselves “anti-Calvinists”) had to say. John Tillotson, a prominent
“Latitudinarian” in the Church of England, was appointed Archbishop of Canterbury by William and Mary just three years after the Glorious Revolution of
1688 brought them to the English throne. About depravity, Tillotson wrote, “it
is true that the nature of man is sadly corrupted and depraved; but not so bad as,
by vicious practices and habits, it may be made … it is a great mistake to argue
the common condition of mankind, from the descriptions that are given in the
Scripture of the worst of men.” He went on to say, “All unregenerate men are not
equally devoid of a sense of God, and spiritual things; they … are very capable
of persuasion.”
Tillotson was just as clear in rejecting predestination: “It is the greatest and justest
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discouragement in the world, to all endeavors of repentance and reformation, to
tell men that they can do nothing in it.” “The end of exhortations and promises
is not to declare to men their power, but their duty. But … it will be a hard thing
to convince men that any thing is their duty, which at the same time we declare
to them to be out of their power.” “We affirm withal the necessity of God’s grace
hereto, and withal the necessity of our co-operating with the grace of God.” “God
cannot be properly said to aid and assist those who do nothing themselves.”
John Taylor, a prominent dissenting Anglican clergyman whose writings attracted much attention in intellectual circles, voiced a similar opposition to the
Calvinist view of depravity. In a treatise that received widespread attention not
just in Britain but in the American colonies as well, written in 1740 (when Adam
Smith was seventeen years old), Taylor argued that “Original sin is incompatible
with Biblical teachings about god’s goodness and justice.” Why? Because “imputed
depravity makes God the author of sin: it means he has sent his creatures into the
world with insuperably sinful inclinations.”
Taylor also echoed Tillotson’s objections to the Calvinist view of predestination
as a discouragement to moral improvement, at either the individual or the collective level: “If all men are by nature utterly indisposed, disabled, and … wholly
inclined to evil … no man is obliged to attempt the reformation of the world;
nor any, except Adam, blamable for whatever wickedness is in it.” “Our natural
facilities are made (and so were Adam’s) by an act of God’s absolute power, without
our knowledge, concurrence, or consent.” “But moral virtue … in its very nature
implieth the choice and consent of a moral agent.” “However God may provide
and apply means to engage our wills to the observance of what is right and true,
… we cannot, as moral agents, observe what is right and true, or be righteous and
holy, without our own free and explicit choice.”
John Wesley, an Anglican clergyman best known today as the founder of Methodism, was active mostly in England (although he also had a brief and not particularly
successful ministry in the American colonies, in Georgia), and mostly during Adam
Smith’s lifetime. Wesley famously shared Smith’s opposition to slavery. But he was
also a bluntly outspoken opponent of the Calvinist view of predestination: “If this
be so,” Wesley wrote, “then is all preaching in vain. It is needless to them that
are elected … And it is useless to them that are not elected … in either case, our
preaching is vain as your hearing is also vain.” “The doctrine of predestination is
not a doctrine of God, because it makes void the ordinance of God … it directly
tends to destroy that holiness which is the end of all the ordinances of God.” “This
uncomfortable doctrine directly tends to destroy our zeal for good works. And …
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it naturally tends … to destroy our love to the greater part of mankind.”
At times, Wesley became hyperbolic in his denunciation of predestination: “This
doctrine ... hath also a manifest tendency to overthrow the whole Christian revelation … making that revelation contradict itself.” “It is a doctrine full of blasphemy
… the blasphemy clearly contained in ‘the horrible decree’ of predestination.” “I
abhor the doctrine of predestination.” It is hard to see how engaged intellectuals
living in the day of Smith and Hume, and regularly participating in conversation
and debate in groups that included intellectually active clergy, would not have
been exposed to this line of argument.
Finally, yet a fourth element in the contentious religious debates of this time that
also plausibly exerted an influence in the development of economic thinking was
separate from the move away from orthodox Calvinism per se but rather revolved
around an eschatological question. The heart of this debate, for purposes of its
influence on economic thinking, was the contrast between the view that progress
in human society will not take place within this world, because this world will
not improve in a meaningful way until after the Second Coming, and the view
that progress in human society is not only possible but inevitable – and, further,
is brought about in part by human agency. Moreover, according to the latter view,
the human actions that help to improve the world thereby help bring the Second
Coming nearer in time, and therefore have explicitly religious value.
This theological dispute is very much still alive today, and especially so within
the United States. As the enormous popularity of the Left Behind novels, by Tim
LaHaye and Jerry Jenkins, attests, many evangelical Protestant groups in America
today adhere to the former, or “pre-millennial” view. At the same time, the latter,
or “post-millennial” view has profoundly shaped American culture and American
history. Within our lifetimes it was unmistakable in the nation’s commitment to
World War II (as it had been in World War I, and before that in the Civil War).
It was even more transparent in the creation of the United Nations. Today we can
see visible evidence of its presence in, for example, the Progress Sphere at Epcot.
The ride through the Progress Sphere illustrates the history of progress in human
communications, an application of science that has often taken on millennial
overtones among British and American Protestants: for example, the development
of the printing press followed immediately by issuing of the Gutenberg bible, the
laying of the first transatlantic cable, and other similar events.
All of these religious questions – depravity versus inherent goodness, predestination versus a role for human agency, glorification of God versus human happiness,
and pre- versus post-millennialism – were under widespread and contentious debate
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within the English-speaking Protestant world at exactly the time that Mandeville,
Hutcheson, Hume and Smith were laying the foundations of modern economics. Because of the depth and fierceness of the controversy, it would have been
impossible, in their circle, not to have paid attention. Most people spend little
time thinking about facts that everyone knows and ideas that everyone accepts.
Instead, what arrests our attention is what is under active and contentious dispute.
Even more telling for the purpose at hand, the new religious thinking that people
like Tillotson and Taylor and Wesley were promoting, leading their world away
from the orthodox Calvinism that had dominated it for more than a century, was
strikingly congruent with the new ideas that Mandeville and Hume and Smith
were introducing in their thinking about what we now call economics. The idea
that individuals can make others better off merely by following the instincts of
their own internal nature is clearly more compatible with the belief that humans
have inherent goodness than with belief in their utter depravity. Smith’s famous
dictum that our inclination to trade in markets is an inborn human propensity,
his straightforward claim that the ongoing effort to “better our condition” is
likewise a fundamental aspect of human nature, and his argument that our different skills and desires (as well as the different resource allocations of different
regions) make the world such that we are therefore better off to engage with one
another economically, are all likewise suggestive that the world is arranged so
as to promote human happiness. The same concept applies as well to different
nations that are likewise able to produce different goods; while in the fifteenth
century many people argued that God had placed the oceans on the earth to keep
nations apart, by the eighteenth century people thought the oceans were there to
promote trade (because by then they understood that it was cheaper to transport
many kinds of goods by sea than by land). Above all, the idea of human agency
and its possibilities for achieving a favorable spiritual outcome is congruent with
the essence of the central conclusion that the actions taken by individuals, acting
on their own – and, as Smith showed, under the right conditions – would make
others better off as well.
Especially in the United States, the religious resonances of these economic
principles were plainly at work in the subsequent reception and dissemination of
the ideas Smith had laid out in the Wealth of Nations. Until the Civil War, most
of the American authors of textbooks in what was then called “political economy”
were either clergymen or other individuals closely identified with one or another
Protestant denomination. The first person known to have delivered a universitylevel economics course in the United States was John McVicker, an Episcopalian
priest who taught at Columbia. The author of the most widely used economics
9

textbook in the ante-bellum United States, with more than 50,000 copies in print
(an astonishing figure in light of how few then attended college), was Francis Wayland. Wayland famously served for nearly three decades as president of Brown; of
course, given Brown’s orientation then, he was a Baptist minister. The author of
the principal competing textbook – written to advance a protectionist viewpoint,
in contrast to Wayland’s advocacy of free trade – was Francis Bowen. Bowen was
a professor at Harvard; consistent with Harvard’s character then, he was a committed and active Unitarian.
The same resonance between economic thinking and religious thinking was visibly
at work in the post-Civil War period as well. In 1885 some fifty or so economists
founded the American Economic Association, which quickly became (and remains
today) the flagship membership organization of the economics profession in the
United States. The writings of those involved in this endeavor make clear that this
was also the beginning of the interpretation of economics as not just a descriptive
science but also an ameliorative project, an effort to make the world a better place
through the use of what was coming to be called “economic policy.”
Many of the key figures involved in founding the American Economic Association had their intellectual roots in the Social Gospel
movement that was capturing the allegiance of so many of America’s
mainline Protestant churches in the late nineteenth century. Richard
T. Ely, the secretary of the new organization during its first seven years and
later its president (and for whom the most distinguished lecture at the annual
American Economic Association meeting is still named), was also co-founder of
the American Institute of Christian Socialism. One of his first books was Social
Aspects of Christianity. But even his economics textbook, An Introduction to Political
Economy, plainly stated his view that “Christianity offers us our highest conception
of a society … and in that conception sets us a goal toward which we must ever
move.” John Bates Clark, another member of the founding group and one of the
new organization’s early presidents (and for whom the most prestigious American
prize in economics is now named), had planned to train for the Congregational
ministry at Yale Divinity School but was persuaded by his undergraduate teacher
at Amherst to go into economics instead. It is no accident that one of his first
books in the field was titled, not “the science of wealth,” or something similar, but
rather The Philosophy of Wealth; the book clearly reflects Clark’s strong religious
interest. Other resonances of this sort went on well into the twentieth century.
Should this influence of religious thinking on economic thinking surprise us?
At one level, no. We have many examples of economic thinking openly and selfconsciously borrowing ideas from other lines of intellectual inquiry. “Gravity models”
10

of international trade posit that the volume of trade between two countries, all
else equal, is proportional to the total production of the first country multiplied
by the total production of the second, and inversely proportional to the square
of the distance between the two countries. As the name applied to such models
recognizes, the underlying template is Newton’s law of universal gravitation. To
analyze financial crises like the one the United States experienced just a few years
ago (and like what the Europeans are trying to avoid today), economists often
use “contagion models” deliberately adapted from epidemiology. For analyzing
how new technology moves from one country to another, economists often use
“migration models” taken from demography. At one level, therefore, the notion
that economics would import ideas into the discipline from other lines of thought
should not surprise us.
At the same time, there is indeed something very surprising about this argument.
Compared to the conventionally accepted view, it gives a very different account
of the origins of economics as a free-standing intellectual discipline. The standard
account is that economics emerged as a product of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, with its emphasis on what we today call secular humanism, in contrast
to the earlier, pre-Enlightenment understanding of a God-centered universe. But
if the argument I am suggesting is correct – if the ideas of Mandeville and Hume
and above all Adam Smith were importantly influenced by the shift in religious
thinking away from orthodox Calvinism and toward post-millennialism – then
that standard account is seriously incomplete. It fails not because Smith and his
colleagues in this effort were religiously committed men (we know Smith and
Hume were not), but because the religious debates to which they were continually
exposed centrally influenced their thinking, and after their lifetimes were important
to how economics developed and has come down to us today. To apply the label for
this kind of intellectual influence offered by the distinguished Harvard economist
Joseph Schumpeter more than a half a century ago, the religious debates of the era
in which these economic thinkers lived formed part of their “pre-analytic vision.”
Taking account of this historical influence of religious thinking on economic
thinking also helps inform our understanding of a number of other aspects of
contemporary economic thinking. Why, for example, do economists normally
resist models in which initial conditions – whether a country is rich or poor, or
whether an individual is born into one set of family circumstances or another –
are determinative of final outcomes? One answer is that such models run counter
to the resonance, which so much of economics since Smith reflects, with a nonpredestinarian view of the world.
Understanding the influence of religious thinking on economic thinking also
11

sheds light on a variety of otherwise puzzling aspects of our contemporary public
discussion of economics, especially in America but elsewhere as well. For example,
a recent Pew Foundation survey asked people, “Is it true that work leads to success
in America?” Members of mainline Protestant denominations were about evenly
divided in their view of the matter. But Evangelical Protestants tended much
more toward the view that work does lead to success, and those who identified
the denominations to which they belonged as “traditionalist” Evangelical groups
expressed this view in even great proportions. In the other direction, people who
said they were atheists were much more inclined to answer that work does not
lead to success.
The same kind of insight applies to debates surrounding economic policy. In
Germany and France and Italy today, and elsewhere in Europe too, many people
criticize what they call “the Anglo-Saxon model” of economic policy. In the United
States we do not use that label, because what the Europeans mean by “the AngloSaxon model” is our way of organizing our economy and conducting economic
policy. But where did the concept of an Anglo-Saxon model come from? And
why does it attract so much disapproval among Europeans and others outside the
English-speaking countries? One part of the answer is the legacy of the religious
influence on Adam Smith and his contemporaries and successors.
The same influence is also visible in our debate over specific economic policies.
A perennial puzzle, for example, is why so many Americans who have no chance of
ever inheriting money from a taxable estate are nonetheless passionately committed
to abolishing what they call “death taxes.” In the United States today, the probability of an individual’s inheriting money from a taxable estate is approximately
equivalent to the probability that an adult male will be 6'9" or that a female will
be 6'3": approximately the top one-quarter of one percent of the population. On
average, Republicans have incomes substantially higher than the average for the
U. S. population, and so it is not surprising that the opposition to estate taxes
that they express is also much greater than among the population as a whole. By
contrast, Democrats, on average, have incomes slightly below the national average;
the opposition to estate taxation that they express is well below that of Americans
overall. How about the opinions expressed by religious groups? Mainline Protestants, on average, have incomes slightly higher than the national average, and they
express slightly greater-than-average opposition to estate taxation – again, not in any
way a surprise. But while members of Evangelical denominations on average have
incomes not only well below the national average but below the average income
of Democrats too, they are more opposed to estate taxes than the population as a
whole (and even more opposed than the Protestant mainliners, with their above12

average incomes). Is all this just a coincidence? Or, here too, might there not be
a religious influence at work?
In light of the evidence, the influence of religious thinking on economic thinking – first on the origins of what we now call economics during the eighteenth
century, then on the evolution of economic thinking down through the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, and today on our contemporary public conversation and
debate over matters of economic policy – seems clear enough. Recognizing this
influence, and taking the connection explicitly into account in how we address
both these historical questions and today’s debates, would not only give us a
deeper and more satisfactory understanding of where the discipline of economics
came from but also help to inform our contemporary public conversation about
economic issues.
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